Using the Global Trust Inventory, an integrated measure of trust toward 21 relationships and institutions, the structure of trust was explored in four East Asian societies (Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). The Western model, in which trust is distributed among seven factors representing different branches of society, did not generalize to these East Asian societies, perhaps due to differences in culture and institutional power structures. Instead, two unique structures of trust were identified. Mainland China had a top-down structure of trust (the China model), in which trust is hierarchically separated between the central government and subordinate implementing bodies. The other three democratic East Asian societies shared a hybrid structure of trust (the Democratic East Asian model) that has a degree of similarity to both the China model and the Western model. Having established two similar, but still distinct models, a crosscultural comparison was made on the proportions of trust profiles generated by latent profile analysis. Mainland China had the largest proportion of people with a high propensity to trust, followed by Japan and South Korea, and Taiwan was the least trusting. Implications of the structure of trust and this alternative approach to conducting cross-cultural comparisons are discussed.
Trust has long been theorized as among the most powerful of "synthetic forces" in society (Simmel, 1950) . It is theorized to facilitate prosperity through establishing and maintaining mutually beneficial social relations (Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995; Newton, 2001; Putnam, 2001) . Previous research has explored the meaning and structure of trust mainly in Western societies; however, these findings frequently do not generalize to some non-Western societies with different cultural values and political arrangements (e.g., Breustedt, 2018; Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011; Mishler & Rose, 1997) . This problem is critical because an equivalent structure of trust is often seen as the prerequisite to make meaningful cross-cultural comparisons (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000) . Using a 21-item Global Trust Inventory (GTI), the present study aimed to explore the structure of trust in four East Asian societies as a reflection of differences in culture and institutional power structures, and then compare the levels of trust across these societies. Specifically, we explored the structure of trust in three East Asian societies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) that are culturally distinct from Western societies, and one East Asian society (Mainland China) culturally similar to these three (under the cultural influence of Confucianism; see Inglehart & Baker, 2000) , but politically distinct (with power concentrated in central government, in contrast to the more pluralistic distribution of power typical of Western and democratic systems; see Liu & Liu, 2003) .
Trust as a Global Construct
Trust is often studied separately from two lines of research: social/interpersonal and political/institutional trust. Research on social trust focuses on the trust between individuals, with the trustee ranging from specific people we know personally (i.e., particularized trust; e.g., Newton & Zmerli, 2011) to "most people" we don't have specific information about (i.e., generalized trust; e.g., Bjørnskov, 2007; Delhey & Newton, 2005) . In comparison, research on political trust focuses on the trust between citizens and political elites or institutions, often by assessing trust or confidence in various institutions (e.g., Breustedt, 2018; Mishler & Rose, 1997) . Liu, Milojev, Gil de Z uñiga, and Zhang (2018) theorized trust as a system of meaning that encompasses both the subcomponents of and an overall grasp of the risks of opening oneself up to a range of dependencies on others. This holistic conceptualization of trust is based on the fact that social and political forms of trust are mutually associated (Newton, Stolle, & Zmerli, 2018; Newton & Zmerli, 2011) : They share the key component of risk management (see Liu et al., 2018) . Across cultures, both institutions such as government and personalized relationships such as family can be relied on to a greater or lesser extent to fulfill their promises/duties-the fact that they might not do so (e.g., both governments and family members might default on a loan) opens the person trusting them to risk. Therefore, the conceptualization and measurement of trust as a global construct allows an exploration of how a person manages his or her dependencies on different relationships ranging from the interpersonal (e.g., families) to the institutionalized (e.g., national or local government).
In 11 societies from Latin America, Catholic Europe, and Western Democracies, Liu et al. (2018) found a seven-factor model of trust with almost scalar measurement invariance. Specifically, a pluralistic "separation of power" structure was found in these Western countries where trust is distributed among different governmental branches (representative government vs. governing bodies vs. security/law enforcement) as well as more personalized factors such as close relationships (encompassing family, extended family, and friends). While these initial results were promising, the analytical strategy adopted by Liu et al. (2018) to establish scalar measurement invariance forced them to restrict their analysis to societies that are similar to each other in terms of culture and institutional power structures. This leaves open some difficult questions. Is the structure of trust invariant between East and West? If not, how is the structure of trust configured in East Asian societies where cultural values and institutional power structures are different from those typical of Western societies? Furthermore, how can a cross-cultural comparison be made if different structures of trust are found?
Cultural Perspectives
Enduring East-West cultural differences could be an important factor that affects how the structure of trust is configured. East Asian societies are often grouped into a single Confucian culture zone (Inglehart & Baker, 2000) , which celebrates relational hierarchy as a virtue (Hwang, 2011; Liu, 2015) . On one hand, the hierarchical aspect of Confucianism enculturates more compliance to the authority of central government (Liu, Li, & Yue, 2010; Liu, Yeh, Wu, Liu, & Yang, 2015) ; these cultural tendencies have been characterized in the cross-cultural literature as high in collectivism and power distance (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, 1992) . On the other hand, the relational aspect of Confucianism encourages an interconnected/holistic view of different forms of social relations, ranging from close relationships with one's own family to relationships with the central government or the ruler .
Thus, from a cultural perspective, we expected that all four East Asian societies might share a single structure of trust that is different from the Western model. Specifically, the system of trust in East Asia should be hierarchically organized in a top-down structure where a contrast between different levels of government (central vs. local) provides the basic organizational structure for trust in government and its implementing bodies. Moreover, different forms of trust are expected to be closely interconnected in East Asia so that fewer and more highly correlated factors would emerge.
Institutional Perspectives
Institutional power structures could be another factor affecting the structure of trust in this region. According to institutional theory (see Mishler & Rose, 2001) , institutional trust should be responsive to the design and performance of institutions. Compared to cultural differences in values (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, 1992) , which are supposed to be enduring, the distribution of institutional power and trust in their power holders can be more transient and depend on what political system is in place. Governmental power has been hierarchically separated in Mainland China since the PRC's government came into power in 1949. The central government makes top-down arrangements for all major affairs, and below that, there is a subordinate implementing system, which consists of political institutions at lower levels that follow the directives of the central government. The prominent feature of the central government is its authority to give orders, which is reinforced by the stringent control over the use of military forces and its ownership of major banks to also control the financial sector (although private-owned and localowned banks have been emerging and gaining autonomy). On the other hand, local government is expected to be part of the subordinate implementing system (together with other noncentral political institutions, as its main purpose is to maintain order and implement the rules set by central government. By contrast, local government in Western-style democracies may have substantial autonomy of power from centralized authority and thus can actively take part in decision-making processes, or even contradict directives of the central government (e.g., the Federal system of the United States).
In contrast, even though they share a Confucian heritage, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have transitioned toward Western democracy with contested elections after World War II. These societies now endorse the separation of powers as a basic governing principle for society (e.g., judiciary independence, contested elections between viable parties), opening up a wider space for the input of civil society that is reflected in the system of checks and balances of power among different branches of society.
Thus, from an institutional perspective, different structures of trust are expected for Mainland China and the other three societies. Mainland China is predicted to have a unique structure of trust (the China model), where the trust toward institutions should be organized as a reflection of the hierarchical power structure emanating from the central government. Specifically, national government, the president, the military force, and banks are likely to form a single factor representing the central government. Local government together with other less powerful governmental institutions (e.g., judiciary, election system, surveillance, and police) should belong to a subordinate implementing bodies factor. However, the trust structure for the other three East Asian societies should resemble the Western model because they share the same political arrangements.
Comparison Based on Latent Profile Analysis
Considering that qualitatively different structures across cultures may be realistically expected in domains such as the structure of trust, a new quantitative analysis strategy to conduct cross-cultural comparison is proposed. The trend in cross-cultural psychology is to require more and more rigor in measurement in terms of invariance (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000) . Traditional linear modeling approaches require a single invariant structure across groups to make mean score comparisons. But this is problematic in areas such as the structure of trust because we have good reason to expect different structures of trust as a reflection of differences in culture and actual power structures in society. Latent profile analysis (LPA; see Jung & Wickrama, 2008 ) is a mixture-modeling approach which estimates latent categorical variables in a sample by grouping people based on similar patterns of responses on indicators. That is, LPA identifies categorically distinct profiles of respondents based on the similarity of their responses to a set of indicator variables. Instead of relying on a single invariant model across groups, LPA could offer a nominal representation of trust profiles as a typology with similar, but not exact, meaning across cultures. This allows for pragmatic cross-cultural comparison of trust profiles, although with lower level precision (i.e., by using a nonparametric chisquare test comparing proportions of nominal categories such as high-, medium-, or low-trusting people). By using this LPA-based comparison, we aimed to test whether Mainland China would really have a higher level of trust than other East Asian societies, as previous research on generalized trust has suggested (e.g., Bjørnskov, 2007; Delhey & Newton, 2005 ; but see qualifying work using radius of trust by Delhey et al., 2011) .
Overview of the Present Study
In summary, cultural and institutional perspectives have suggested competing models of trust in East Asia. If cross-cultural psychology is correct such that enduring differences in cultural values characterize East Asian versus Western societies, then the four East Asian societies should share a single top-down structure of trust with fewer and more highly correlated factors, which is different from the seven-factor "separation of powers" structure of trust in Western societies. Alternatively, if institutional power structures matter, then the "topdown" centralized structure of trust should only apply to Mainland China while the other three democratic East Asian societies should have a "separation of powers" structure similar to that of Western societies.
Considering the intertwining influences of culture and political arrangement and the range of trust relationships included in the GTI, some degree of exploratory testing was allowed in the data analysis. For example, a hybrid model might emerge in the three democratic East Asian societies, which is likely to share some degree of similarity with both the China model and the Western model.
Methods

Participants and Sampling Procedure
The present study analyzed data from a large international digital influence survey (for details of the sampling frame and methods, see Gil de Z uñiga & Liu, 2017) . This survey was administrated online by the polling firm Nielsen. Stratified quota sampling techniques were used to create representative samples on age, gender, and region in each country. All items were translated for each country by a group of participating scholars, employing either back-translation (Behling & Law, 2000) or a committee approach (Brislin, 1980) . Notes. Ext fam = extended family; Gvt surv = Government Surveillance; Imm family = immediate family; Loc gvt = local government; Multi corps = multinational corporations; Nat gvt = national governemnt; PM = prime minister; Stock mrkt = stock market; **Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two-tailed).
Data from four East Asian societies were used in the present study (N = 3,930; 46% female), including Mainland China (n = 1,004; 44.4% female), Japan (n = 975; 42.2% female), South Korea (n = 943; 46.7% female), and Taiwan (n = 1,008; 49.2% female). The average age was M = 40.08, SD = 12.735 (Mainland China M = 38.66, SD = 11.979; Japan M = 46.69, SD = 12.876; South Korea M = 38.87, SD = 12.711; Taiwan M = 36.29, SD = 10.891).
Measures
The 21-item GTI (Liu et al., 2018) was used to assess self-reported trust toward different institutions and relationships. Participants were asked to "Please rate your feelings of trust towards the following people and organisations using the scale below." All items were rated on a 1 (Do not trust at all) to 7 (Trust completely) scale. 
Results
To test the structure of trust that could fit each of four societies, we first conducted several confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Chi-square and confirmatory fit index (CFI) > .900 were used as main criteria for the acceptance of model while other model fit indices such as root mean square error of approcximation (RMSEA), the TuckerLewis index (TLI), and standardized root mean residual (SRMR) also were included as supplementary criteria.
Then, measurement invariance was tested on the identified model(s) by using multigroup CFA (see Vandenberg & Lance, 2000) . Specifically, configural, metric, and scalar invariance were tested in turn. Configural invariance, in which the model structure is fixed across groups, is a weak factorial invariance necessary for subsequent tests. Metric invariance, in which the factor loadings are further fixed across groups, allows interpretations of observed covariance relationships between the factors and covariates. Scalar invariance, in which the intercepts are further fixed across groups, is necessary for making meaningful mean-level comparisons between groups.
To allow cross-cultural comparison, we used the chisquare test of independence (see Beasley & Schumacker, 1995) to compare the proportion of trust profiles generated by LPA on trust factor structure(s). Results showed that the Western model did not perform well in the four East Asian societies. Specifically, identification problems were presented with the latent variable covariance matrix being ill-identified, with linear dependency among more than two variables. We also tested the Western model on each of these four societies separately, and the same identification problems occurred in each individual society. This can be a problem when using CFA to test a model in different societies (e.g., Breustedt, 2018) , and it requires further modification of the model. Thus, the universality of the Western model was not supported.
Because the Western model was not replicated in East Asia, a China model was proposed and tested first in Mainland China and then in all four societies. We expected the China model to be the most dramatically different from the Western model because Mainland China differs the most from the West both culturally and institutionally. According to our views, the China model should have: (a) a central government factor that includes governmental institutions in the top level (National Government and President) as well as other powerful institutions that solidify the centralized power (Military and Banks) and (b) an implementing bodies factor that includes institutions at local or lower levels (e.g., Local Government, Police, and Judiciary). Thus, the following changes were made to the Western model to create a "China model:" Banks and Military were loaded onto the Government factor (together with President and National Government), and we renamed this factor as Central Government; Local Government and Police were loaded onto the Governing Bodies factor (together with Judiciary, Election, and Government Surveillance), and we renamed this factor Implementing Bodies; following the suggestion of fit indices, the Tax System item was loaded onto the Financial and Corporate Institutions factor. These modifications thus suggested a six-factor China model (see Figure 1) . This model fit the data in Mainland China well, but the model fit indices for the other three societies as well as the overall sample were poor (see Table 2 ).
Besides the six-factor model, several alternative models also were tested in Mainland China. The first alternative model specified a five-factor structure where Central Government and Implementing Bodies were merged into one single Government factor, with remaining factors kept the same. The results showed a worse model fit: v 2 (179) = 1,582.016, p < .001, RMSEA = .088 [.084, .092], CFI = .888, TLI = .868, SRMR = .058. Then, a four-factor model was specified where the Financial/ Corporate factor was merged into the Government factor. The results showed a worse model fit: Overall, a unique six-factor China model responsive to the specifics in Mainland China was identified. However, this China model did not generalize to other societies in this region, which suggests that the different power structures in these other three societies contributed to making a difference in the structure of trust.
Thus, as the China model did not have good model fit in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, a Democratic East Asia model was proposed and tested. According to our views, the Democratic East Asia model should be similar to the Western model in which trust is separated among different governmental branches. We also allowed some degree of exploratory testing, considering the intertwining influences of culture and political arrangements. Thus, the following changes were made based on the China model to create a Democratic East Asian model: trust in National Government, Local Government, and the President were loaded onto the Government factor, trust in the Tax System loaded onto the Governing Bodies, trust in Banks loaded onto the Financial and Corporate Institutions (all as in the Western model); following the suggestion of fit indices, trust in Military was loaded onto the Community. These modifications resulted in a six-factor Democratic East Asia model (see Figure 2) . This model had a good fit in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, but had a poor fit in Mainland China. Further tests showed that the Democratic East Asia model had good model fit in the overall sample, and an even better model fit for the overall sample without Mainland China (for model fit indices, see Table 3 ).
Alternative models were tested in the overall East Asian sample without Mainland China. We then tested the measurement invariance of the Democratic East Asian model in the three democratic societies. As can be seen in Table 4 , there was good model fit for both configural and metric invariance, but full scalar invariance was not achieved. A partial scalar invariant model could be established after some intercepts were set free, as suggested by modification indices (i.e., Judiciary and Oil Companies in Japan; Scientists and Banks in South Korea; and Stock Market, Ethnic Group, and Tax in Taiwan).
In summary, a partial scalar invariance model was supported in the three democratic East Asian societies, but not in the overall sample including Mainland China. As expected, different structures of trust emerged in Notes. Maximum Likelihood with Robust estimates of SEs (MLR). CFI = comparative fit index; CI = confidence interval; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean residual; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index.
Mainland China versus the other three democratic East Asian societies as the reflection of different political arrangements. This did not allow mean score comparisons based on traditional linear models. In the following section, we develop a cross-cultural comparison on a nominal, or categorical, basis using the proportions of trust profiles calculated using LPA.
Trust Profiles
Two LPA were conducted separately by using the mean scores of the two models identified previously: the China model on the sample from Mainland China, and the Democratic East Asian model on the sample from the other three societies. To identify the optimal latent Figure 2 The six-factor East Asian model (GVT = Government, a = .886; GVTBODY = Governing Bodies, a = .905; FINCORP = Financial Institutions and Corporations, a = .852; KNOW = Knowledge Producers, a = .840; COMMNTY = Community, a = .864; CLOSE = Close Relations, a = .779). Diagram presents standardized parameter estimates based on pooled sample from the Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan samples (n = 2,926).
profile solution, we examined a range of solutions by using the Vong-Lo-Mendell-Rubin (VLMR) testing procedure as well as the Information Criteria (Akaike Information Criterion [AIC] and adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion [aBIC]). Lower values of the Information Criteria suggest a better fit. The VLMR statistics compares a k profile solution with a kÀ1 profile solution, and a significant p value suggests that the k profile has a better fit than does the kÀ1 profile. In addition, entropy was used as a supplementary criterion.
Higher values indicate a clearer separation of profiles (range = 0-1, and entropy > .80 is typically seen as a cutoff point). We also assessed the substantive contribution and interpretability of the profiles identified.
Regarding the China model, the Information Criteria and the VLMR statistics for solutions ranging from one to five profiles are presented in Table 5 . The Information Criteria and the VLMR test suggested that the four-profile model is the best solution (entropy = .875), and this solution was clearly interpretable. Thus, we identified the four-profile model as the optimal solution for Mainland China.
The four identified Trust Profiles are presented in Figure 3 . The largest profile (38.9%, n = 391)-Moderate-to-High Trust-was characterized by moderate to high levels of trust across the six factors of trust, with slightly lower ratings on Implementing Bodies and Financial Institutions. The second-largest profile (29.5%, Notes. Maximum Likelihood with Robust estimates of SEs (MLR). CFI = comparative fit index; CI = confidence interval; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean residual; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index. Notes. Maximum Likelihood with Robust estimates of SEs (MLR). CFI = comparative fit index; CI = confidence interval; SRMR = standardized root mean residual; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index. Regarding the Democratic East Asia data, the Information Criteria and the VLMR for solutions ranging from 1 to 10 profiles are presented in Table 6 . While the VLMR test would suggest that the nine-profile model was the best solution, the Information Criteria indicated that the decrease of model fit leveled off at the four-profile solution (entropy = .874, higher than all solutions with more than four profiles). The nine-profile solution also was not parsimonious, with several latent profiles having more or less the same patterns with slightly higher or lower mean scores. This solution also was clearly interpretable and comparable to the four-profile solution in the China model. Thus, we identified the four-profile model as the optimal and most parsimonious solution.
The four identified Trust Profiles based on the Democratic East Asian data are presented in Figure 4 . The largest profile (32.3%, n = 946)-Low-to-Moderate Trust-was characterized by a moderate to high level of trust in Close Relations; moderate levels of trust in Knowledge Producers and Community; and moderate to low levels of trust in Government, Governing Bodies, and Financial Institutions. The second-largest profile (31.9%, n = 933)-Moderate-to-High Trust-was characterized by a moderate to high level of trust in Close Relations; and moderate levels of trust in all other factors, with Government and Financial Institutions being slightly lower. The third-largest profile (24.0%, n = 702) -Low Trust-was characterized by very low levels of trust across all factors of trust, except a moderate level of trust in Close Relations. The smallest profile (11.8%, n = 344)-High Trust-was characterized by very high levels of trust across all factors of trust, except moderate to high levels of trust in Government and Financial Institutions.
In summary, the latent profile solutions in Mainland China and the other three East Asian societies had both similarities and uniqueness. Both solutions had four structurally similar profiles with relatively similar levels of trust for interpersonal/social and political/institutionalized forms of trust. By way of comparison, almost one third of the sample in the West had a relatively high level of interpersonal trust and comparatively low levels of institutional trust (see the Low Institutional Trust profile; Liu et al., 2018) . This seemed to corroborate the more interconnected/holistic view of different forms of social relations in Confucianist culture as compared to the West .
The profile solution based on the China model was characterized by a high level of trust toward Central Government, which was higher than Implementing Bodies consistently across all profiles, and as high as Close Relations in the High Trust profile and in Moderate-to-High Trust profile. However, trust toward (representative) Government was lower than that for Governing Bodies and Close Relations consistently across profiles in the other three East Asian societies, which was similar to the findings in Western societies (see Liu et al., 2018) . This seemed to reflect the unique impact of political arrangements in Mainland China, where the citizens typically have a high level of trust in Central Government, but are dissatisfied with lower level institutions (e.g., Li, 2004) .
Cross-Cultural Comparisons Based on Trust Profiles
Following Hanke et al. (2015) , we generated the prevalence of trust profiles for each of the three democratic East Asian societies based on the latent profile solution of the Democratic East Asian model, and then compared these with the proportion of trust profiles generated by the latent profile solution of the China model. Although these two profile solutions had some unique features (i.e., factor structure and relative level of factor scores), we believed that a practical cross-cultural comparison could be made because the nominal categories of high, moderate-to-high, low-to-moderate, and low trusting people can be interpreted meaningfully in both situations. They consistently reflect individual differences in the propensity to trust across a wide range of relationships.
As can be seen in Figure 5 , clear differences exist in terms of the proportions of the four profiles across societies. The Pearson chi-square value, v 2 (9) = 314.43, p < .001, suggested significant differences in the proportions of trust profiles across societies.
Post hoc analysis 1 showed that Mainland China had the highest proportion of the High Trust people (21.6%), followed by Japan and South Korea (14.9 and 14.3%, respectively), and Taiwan had the lowest (6.4%). Mainland China and Japan had the highest proportion of the Moderate-to-High Trust profile (38.9 and 38.4%, respectively), followed by South Korea (34.4%) and Taiwan (23.3%). Mainland China and Japan had the lowest proportion of the Low-Trust profile (10.0 and 14.7%, respectively), followed by South Korea (21.7%) and Taiwan (35.2%). Finally, there was no significant difference on the proportion of Low-to-Moderate Trust profile individuals (Mainland China = 29.5%, Japan = 32.1%, South Korea = 29.6%, and Taiwan = 35.1%).
In summary, Mainland China, in general, had a high level of trust, with the highest proportion of High Trust profiles and one of the highest proportion of Moderateto-High Trust profiles; Japan and South Korea had similar levels of trust, with moderately high proportions of High Trust and Moderate-to-High Trust profiles; Taiwan had the lowest level of trust among these four societies. Consistent with previous literature on generalized trust (e.g., Bjørnskov, 2007; Delhey & Newton, 2005) , these findings showed that Mainland China enjoys a higher level of trust than do other East Asian societies. 
Discussion
Overall, two different factor structures of trust were found in four East Asian societies. Mainland China had a top-down structure of trust (the China model), where trust toward governmental institutions is conceptually separated between the central government (including the national government, president, military, and banks) and subordinate implementing bodies (including local government, police etc.). Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan shared another structure of trust (the Democratic East Asia model), which has a degree of similarity to both the Western model (a nonhierarchical separation between representative government and governing bodies) and the China model (a parsimonious six-factor structure). Consistent with Inglehart and Baker's (2000) argument that both modernization and culture have an impact on changes in values, the structure of trust appears to be influenced largely by current institutional power structures, and enduring cultural heritage also plays a role. On one hand, both the China model and the Democratic East Asia model are different from the Western "separation of powers" model, which seems to confirm the findings from cross-cultural psychology regarding enduring cultural differences between the East and the West. On the other hand, the China model differed from the other three East Asian societies, which shows that the structure of trust changes with institutional changes reflecting actual power differences in society, as suggested by institutional theory. The unique power structure in Mainland China could help us to understand why it has a high level of trust.
Consistent with previous research using a standardized generalized trust item from the World Values Survey (e.g., Bjørnskov, 2007; Delhey & Newton, 2005) , our findings showed that Mainland China has a very high proportion of high trustors. Our data and analyses suggest that this may be a general rather than specific and limited condition, as theorized by Delhey et al. (2011) . They argued that the "radius of trust" is small in China, limited to the personally known ingroup (similar the Close Relations in the present study) but hard to generalize to outgroup members (e.g., "people of another nationality"). Using a more comprehensive set of trust relations than did Delhey et al. (2011) , we found the "radius of trust" in China to be quite broad: There were substantially positive correlations among the 21 indicators of trust that we measured (see Table 1 ), leading to strongly positive correlations among all six trust factors. This means that while trust in Close Figure 4 The identified latent trust profiles and the mean levels of trust across the six factors based on the Democratic East Asia model. Relations is one of the highest among the factors of trust in Chinese society (as it is in every other society we measured, see Liu et al., 2018) , trust is in no way restricted to this small circle of the interpersonally known. Rather, an authoritative, but competent, central government may offer psychological security for reducing the perceived risks associated with trusting social exchange involving other institutions and actors in society, thus enhancing prospects for cooperation in society at large. The unique and crucial conceptual separation in Mainland China is between different levels of government (central government and subordinate implementing bodies). This might be important for maintaining high trust because incidents that sabotage trust toward central government in other societies could be insulated from blame by the intervening layer of (lower) trust toward local government and other implementing bodies in Mainland China (see Cai, 2008) . Where there is no public disputation against the central government, there also is, at least on the surface, high trust in the central government and its ability to competently execute long-term plans that may benefit other organizations/relationships in society (for a cultural angle on this, see Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Liu et al., 2010) . This might be a different form of cultural capital (Liu, 2015) than the bottom-up social capital theorized for democratic societies (Putnam, 2001) .
In contrast, Taiwan, although it is culturally similar to Mainland China, was dominated by low trust and the lowto-moderate trust profiles. The big difference is that Taiwan has a contentious mass media, and is a fully democratic society wherein few institutions are authoritative. A decline in social capital (a closely related concept to trust; see Putnam, 2001 ) observed in the United States and other Western democracies may have hit Taiwan as part of the postdemocracy blues. Constant disputation between the two dominant political parties (with different views of the proper relationship with the Mainland China, each with their supporting mass media apparatuses that frequently attack the other party when they are in power; see Huang, Liu, & Chang, 2004) reduces trust, as well as the fact that trust is often low in newly established democracies (see Mishler & Rose, 2002) . Although these four societies have different political arrangements, the enduring impacts of cultural values also could be reflected in the emergence of the parsimonious structure with fewer trust factors. Unlike the young democracies in Latin America, which could fit into the seven-factor Western model with Security Institutions as a separate factor (Liu et al., 2018) , the young democracies in East Asia shared a six-factor structure of trust where police and military merged into other factors rather than stood together as a Security factor. This seems inconsistent with the argument that insufficient experience of democracy is the only reason for a holistic evaluation of institutions. Instead, we suspect the cultural heritage also could play a role: An interconnected/holistic view of different social relations in Confucianist culture is likely to contribute to fewer factor structures in trust. How this relational aspect of Confucianist would factor into the social integration and stability in young East Asian democracies as well as in Mainland China is worth future exploration.
There is a tension in cross-cultural research between the increasingly stringent requirement for measurement invariance and the fact that universal measurement on some basic concepts seems difficult to achieve (e.g., in the domain of values; see Schwartz, 1992) . Building on previous research that has compared the level of trust within and beyond East Asian cultures (e.g., Huff & Kelley, 2003) , the present study contributes to the literature by testing the psychometric equivalence of the global system of trust in representative samples and by providing a novel approach for dealing with the lack of equivalence. For trust toward governmental institutions, where we have good reasons to expect differences in structures and meanings, a pragmatic cross-cultural comparison could be made by employing a nonparametric chi-square test on proportions of high trustors amongst other various meaningful profiles. This approach provides an alternative to the more continuous dimensions of the cross-cultural variability approach adopted by Schwartz (1992) or Leung and Bond (2004) when countries are too disparate to force into a single homogenous invariant model. This approach has promise because the requirement of measurement invariance and measurement precision requires a trade-off against the reality of substantive variability between cultures. Allowing more than one latent factor model while using nonparametric tests to make cross-cultural comparisons between substantively different societies (e.g., East vs. West) might be an important step forward to understand similarity and difference in a world where globalization does not imply homogeneity (Inglehart & Baker, 2000) .
There are some limitations in the present study that could be advanced in future research. First, we assume that the trust profiles could reflect relatively universal individual differences in the propensity to trust; thus, it is meaningful to make cross-cultural comparisons even when factor-structure differences exist. However, the actual association between trust profiles and cooperative behaviors still needs to be tested to confirm the validity of this assertion. Second, we suspect that cultural heritage could contribute to the emergence of the parsimonious structure of trust in East Asia, but the specific reason for the collapse of the Security Institutions factor may be worth future scrutiny. (Liu et al., 2018) , where the high trustors were less likely to be women, however, women in Mainland China seemed to be more trusting.
